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Duncan should have the advantage during prolonged open-space striking. He is longer, more accurate at range and substantially more diverse with his kicking game. Allen cannot afford to repeatedly enter from predictable range because Duncan has enough power and creativity to punish those entries. Duncan’s recent development also deserves significant weight: beating Cannonier and Dolidze consecutively is much stronger evidence than treating him primarily as an athletic prospect with flashy striking. His current five-fight streak represents genuine competitive progression rather than simply favorable matchmaking.
The central issue is still Duncan’s defensive grappling. His published UFC takedown defense is only 58%, while Allen has repeatedly demonstrated that he can convert grappling opportunities into extended positional sequences rather than merely completing isolated takedowns. Duncan’s fight against Dolidze is particularly relevant: Dolidze completed three takedowns and accumulated substantial control, including more than three minutes in Round 3. Duncan comfortably won the first two rounds through striking, but the third showed that sustained wrestling remains a viable way to change the fight against him. Allen is much more dangerous than Dolidze once those positions become submission-oriented.
However, Allen’s grappling advantage should not be treated as automatic. His most recent fight against Shahbazyan was overwhelmingly a striking fight: Allen went only 1-for-4 on takedowns and accumulated just 28 seconds of control. Duncan also has enough length, athleticism and improving defensive awareness to make repeated entries expensive. This creates an important conditional branch: if Allen cannot consistently turn clinch entries into meaningful control, Duncan becomes increasingly likely to win the fight at distance. That prevents this from becoming a 65–70% Allen prediction despite the apparent stylistic grappling advantage.
Five rounds shift the matchup toward Allen. Duncan has never fought beyond three rounds in the UFC, whereas Allen has already operated effectively in championship-round conditions and stopped Reinier de Ridder after four rounds. Allen therefore has substantially more evidence supporting his ability to manage prolonged pressure, fatigue and tactical transitions. Duncan may win the cleaner striking exchanges early, but maintaining the movement and defensive reactions necessary to repeatedly deny Allen becomes progressively harder over 25 minutes.
The market currently has Allen around the mid-50s in implied probability, which is close enough that there is no meaningful divergence warning; MMA1 comes out slightly stronger on Allen because of the five-round structure and Duncan’s demonstrated susceptibility to sustained control. Duncan nevertheless has very legitimate upset equity, particularly by winning early rounds at range or hurting Allen during an entry. The most plausible Allen path is not necessarily an immediate takedown and submission, but surviving Duncan’s strongest striking phase, repeatedly forcing him to defend wrestling and clinch sequences, and eventually finding the back as Duncan’s defensive efficiency declines. Allen 58% is the pick, but this is not a high-confidence favorite.


The age difference is difficult to ignore at lightweight. Camilo is 25 while Herbert is 38, creating a 13-year gap at a division where speed, reactions and recovery matter considerably. Camilo is also moving in the opposite developmental direction: after losing his UFC debut to Gabe Green, he defeated Viacheslav Borshchev and then stopped Nazim Sadykhov in the first round. Herbert remains dangerous and just knocked out Mandel Nallo, so his age should not be treated as evidence of immediate collapse, but the combination of Camilo’s youth, physicality and recent progression gives him a meaningful baseline advantage.
Herbert’s best path is nevertheless very real because the dimensions strongly favor him. He is 6’1” with a 77-inch reach compared with Camilo at approximately 5’10” and 69 inches. Camilo therefore has to cross an unusually large range disadvantage to establish either his boxing pressure or wrestling. Herbert can punish those entries with straight punches, knees and kicks, and his 10 career knockout victories demonstrate that this isn’t merely point-scoring offense. Camilo cannot simply be awarded his grappling advantage without accounting for the cost of reaching Herbert.
Once Camilo gets through that range, however, the matchup changes considerably. His UFC numbers currently show roughly 4.2 takedowns per 15 minutes with 54% accuracy, while Herbert has historically been much more comfortable operating as a kickboxer than repeatedly defending physical wrestling exchanges. Camilo also doesn’t need a submission for the grappling to pay off. Takedowns, cage pressure and control can disrupt Herbert’s preferred rhythm while forcing the older fighter to repeatedly stand and reset. That is especially important because Camilo’s win over Borshchev already demonstrated that he can use a more measured route rather than depending on an early finish.
There is also a durability distinction worth considering without overstating it. Camilo has never been stopped by strikes professionally; all three of his losses have come by submission. Herbert has been knocked out three times. But Herbert’s recent Nallo knockout is evidence that his offensive timing and power remain dangerous at 38, so projecting Camilo to simply overwhelm him early would be too aggressive. Herbert’s experience advantage is enormous—10 UFC appearances versus only three for Camilo—and he has faced substantially stronger opposition, including Ilia Topuria, Renato Moicano, Fares Ziam and Ľudovít Klein.
The market is around Camilo -200 / Herbert +165, approximately consistent with Camilo being a low-to-mid 60% favorite after removing the vig. That is very close to the MMA1 result, so there is no meaningful market-divergence warning here. The decisive question is whether Camilo can reliably cross Herbert’s eight-inch reach advantage without repeatedly absorbing damaging counters. I think his youth, pressure, physicality, wrestling threat and improving striking give him enough different ways to do it, but Herbert’s dimensions and power keep this competitive. Camilo 64% is the pick, with decision more likely than an assumed grappling or early-KO finish.


Souza’s power is the most important reason not to make Godinez an overwhelming favorite. Souza has nine knockout victories and is coming off a first-round head-kick KO of Ariane Carnelossi. She has also won three of her last four, so this is not simply a striker receiving a difficult stylistic matchup while trending downward. Godinez absorbs enough offense that Souza should have opportunities to land, and damage has to be weighted ahead of Godinez’s pressure or raw activity if Souza is consistently connecting with the cleaner, harder strikes.
Godinez nevertheless has the more reliable round-winning structure. She averages 4.43 significant strikes landed per minute while adding 2.99 takedowns per 15 minutes, giving her two independent ways to accumulate scoring offense. The important distinction is that her wrestling shouldn’t receive credit simply because takedowns are available: she has completed only 15 of 94 UFC attempts. Her 16% takedown accuracy means repeated failed entries can become costly against someone with Souza’s power. Godinez therefore needs the wrestling threat to complement her pressure and striking rather than assuming she can dominate Souza on the ground.
The strongest evidence for Godinez is the level at which her game has recently worked. Most importantly, she is coming off a win over Tatiana Suarez. That result substantially strengthens the reliability of Godinez’s physicality, defensive wrestling and ability to remain functional against high-level pressure. It also reduces the concern that Souza can simply change the matchup by introducing occasional grappling herself. Godinez additionally owns 77% UFC takedown defense, making Souza’s most realistic winning path primarily striking-based.
Souza has improved enough that her older losses should not be treated as a fixed representation of her current level. Her recent wins over Bruna Brasil and Carnelossi indicate continuing development, while the earlier split decisions against Angela Hill and Piera Rodriguez show that she can remain competitive across three rounds. But those fights also reinforce the central concern: against opponents who survive her dangerous offense and continue producing consistently, Souza can end up in close minute-winning contests rather than separating herself through damage.
The current market has Godinez roughly -215 to -250, with Souza around +175 to +200, putting the market’s vig-adjusted expectation close to the mid-to-high 60s for Godinez. MMA1 lands almost exactly there, so there is no market-divergence warning. The matchup comes down to Souza’s damage versus Godinez’s repeatable output and wrestling pressure. Souza has enough power to steal rounds or potentially create a finish, but Godinez has more reliable pathways to win minutes and can force Souza to solve several problems simultaneously. Over three rounds, that makes Godinez 67% the pick, most likely by decision.


Fili’s experience is a legitimate advantage. He has spent more than a decade fighting UFC-level opposition and has faced a much deeper collection of opponents than Kamaka, including Max Holloway, Yair Rodriguez, Calvin Kattar, Sodiq Yusuff and Dan Ige. That experience makes Fili difficult to surprise tactically, and at 6’0” with a 74-inch reach he also possesses useful dimensions for featherweight. Kamaka cannot assume that simply applying pressure will consistently get him inside without paying for entries.
The larger concern is whether Fili can maintain control of the fight consistently enough. At 36, with more than 30 professional fights and considerable accumulated damage, his athletic margin is narrower than it was earlier in his career. His durability has also been unreliable: Fili has suffered multiple knockout losses, including relatively recent stoppages against Joanderson Brito and Melquizael Costa. That matters against Kamaka less because Kamaka is a huge puncher and more because Fili’s defensive reactions under sustained combinations are no longer something I want to assume will remain stable.
Kamaka’s strongest advantage is his repeatability. He can box in combination, pressure without recklessly chasing a finish and introduce wrestling when opponents become too comfortable striking. That creates an important scoring problem for Fili. Even if Kamaka’s takedowns do not generate prolonged control, the threat can compress Fili’s movement and help Kamaka establish his boxing. The wrestling therefore has value here, but it should not be double-counted as automatic round-winning control unless Kamaka actually converts his entries into meaningful positional offense.
Fili still has meaningful upset equity because this is likely to contain extended striking phases. His length, kicks and counterpunching can punish Kamaka’s forward movement, and Kamaka has historically been hittable enough that Fili should have opportunities. Fili also remains capable of mixing in his own takedowns. The concern is sustained initiative: if neither fighter produces clearly superior damage, Kamaka’s combination volume, pressure and positional initiative give him a more dependable path to winning close rounds. Fili’s tendency to fight in relatively competitive stretches rather than consistently impose himself becomes important in that type of matchup.
This is therefore more of a decision-reliability pick than a dominance pick. Fili has the experience and technical versatility to make individual rounds close, but Kamaka is younger, more consistent physically, has the stronger pressure/output profile and can attack through both boxing and wrestling. Fili’s veteran experience keeps me from pushing Kamaka toward 70%, while Fili’s durability history makes me reluctant to bring the matchup close to 50/50 simply because of his résumé. Kamaka 62% is the pick, most likely through three rounds of higher sustained output and mixed offense.


Wellmaker has the more dangerous proven striking weapons in this specific matchup. He stopped Cameron Saaiman and Kris Moutinho in consecutive first rounds, and his UFC numbers show 55% significant-strike accuracy with roughly 4.6 significant strikes landed per minute. More importantly, his power isn’t dependent on overwhelming volume. He can generate a fight-changing connection during relatively short exchanges, which becomes significant against Tanzilovi’s current 50% significant-strike defense.
But Wellmaker’s two subsequent losses materially reduce confidence. Ethyn Ewing beat him over three rounds, and Juan Diaz submitted him after taking him down five times. That creates a very relevant route for Tanzilovi. Against Shane Collins, Tanzilovi completed 5 of 9 takedowns and accumulated more than four minutes of control. His early UFC sample therefore suggests that wrestling is not merely something he possesses theoretically; he is willing and able to build his offense around it.
The important distinction is converting those takedowns into winning offense. Despite completing five against Collins, Tanzilovi still lost 30-27 on all three scorecards. Collins was more active and effective, while Tanzilovi’s wrestling failed to generate enough sustained offensive value. Collins also threatened submissions while Tanzilovi entered for takedowns. This is exactly the type of matchup where raw takedown numbers can exaggerate the effectiveness of a wrestling advantage.
Wellmaker’s loss to Diaz nevertheless makes the grappling threat impossible to dismiss. If Tanzilovi can repeatedly put Wellmaker on his back, Wellmaker’s power becomes progressively less relevant and Tanzilovi can absolutely win a decision. But there is an important difference between Diaz’s submission-oriented grappling and Tanzilovi’s demonstrated game: Tanzilovi has zero professional submission victories, whereas Wellmaker’s most obvious defensive weakness has been submission grappling rather than simply being controlled. Tanzilovi therefore shouldn’t automatically inherit Diaz’s successful pathway.
There is also a deceptively important striking risk for Tanzilovi. His seven knockouts suggest considerable offensive power, but Wellmaker has never been knocked out professionally, while Tanzilovi has now shown that he can absorb substantial clean offense when his wrestling does not dictate the fight. Tanzilovi absorbed 76 significant strikes against Collins. Against Wellmaker, allowing repeated clean exchanges carries considerably greater consequences because Wellmaker needs fewer successful connections to alter the fight.
This is consequently much closer than Wellmaker’s highlight-reel UFC beginnings would have suggested. His consecutive losses exposed real vulnerabilities, while Tanzilovi’s UFC debut provided useful evidence that his wrestling can translate against UFC opposition. But Tanzilovi has not yet demonstrated that his control consistently converts into enough damage, submissions or round-winning dominance, and his defensive striking gives Wellmaker opportunities to land the matchup’s most consequential offense. Wellmaker 55% is the pick, with a Round 2 KO/TKO as the most likely individual outcome, but this is a moderate-to-low confidence selection.