UFC 331: Joshua Van vs Alexandre Pantoja

The first fight provides almost no usable matchup evidence. Pantoja’s loss occurred only 26 seconds in when he dislocated his elbow after posting on the mat; it should be treated as an injury stoppage rather than evidence that Van had solved Pantoja. Pantoja now says he is healthy, and there is no current indication that the elbow is preventing him from competing normally.

The biggest change since that fight is Van’s continued development. At only 24, he has now successfully defended the championship with a fifth-round TKO of Tatsuro Taira, whereas Pantoja returns at 36 after roughly nine months away. This strongly activates our CPDM/LPS logic: the age gap is enormous for flyweight, while Van is still improving physically and technically. Van’s combination volume, speed, body attacks and ability to maintain offense deep into fights become increasingly problematic if Pantoja cannot establish meaningful grappling control early.

Pantoja nevertheless has the clearest stylistic route to beating Van. His UFC profile shows roughly 2.79 takedowns per 15 minutes and 1.0 submission attempt, compared with Van’s much more striking-centric game. Van’s historical takedown defense is good, but our TDGD/GUS/WUT rules prevent treating TDD as equivalent to complete grappling safety. Pantoja doesn’t need to repeatedly dominate conventional takedowns; one successful transition to Van’s back can radically change the fight. This is why I still give Pantoja a substantial 42% rather than treating Van’s youth and striking as overwhelming advantages.

Where I favor Van is the cost Pantoja must pay to repeatedly create those grappling exchanges. Van’s UFC striking numbers are extraordinary in pace—historically around 8+ significant strikes landed per minute—and Pantoja has never been an especially elusive defensive striker. Under ECA/DVC, failed entries, prolonged pocket exchanges and unsuccessful clinch attempts become progressively expensive against Van. Pantoja can absolutely win R1-R2 through pressure, takedowns and back exposure, but every unsuccessful sequence feeds Van’s preferred high-output fight.

The five-round trajectory is decisive. I expect Pantoja to be extremely dangerous during the first two rounds and potentially ahead early. But Van’s pace, 12-year youth advantage and demonstrated ability to produce offense late give him increasing equity as the fight progresses. The market is currently much closer—roughly Van -130 to -136 and Pantoja +105 to +115—so the model’s 58/42 assessment represents only a moderate divergence and does not trigger our 20-point MDA alarm. My projected sequence is Pantoja having real grappling success early, Van surviving without conceding a submission, and the striking/physicality gap becoming progressively larger until Van overwhelms a slowing Pantoja in Round 4.

This is fundamentally a grappling-access versus striking-danger matchup. Ruffy has developed into one of lightweight’s most dangerous finishers: he is 14-2 with 13 KO/TKO victories and most recently stopped Michael Chandler in Round 1. At 5’11” with roughly a 75-inch reach, he also carries meaningful length over the 5’7” Tsarukyan. Ruffy’s 28% is therefore meaningful upset equity rather than generic underdog probability: catching Arman during an entry, intercepting him with a knee/kick, or forcing prolonged distance striking is a legitimate winning path.

The decisive issue is whether Ruffy can repeatedly prevent Tsarukyan from accessing the wrestling phase. Unlike matchups where our ECA/GUS/WUT rules warn against assuming wrestling automatically produces useful control, Tsarukyan has repeatedly validated the complete sequence: entries → takedowns → scrambling → positional control → offense/submission threats. His most recent UFC fight reinforced that point when he submitted Dan Hooker in Round 2. Ruffy must defend not one takedown but interconnected attempts, mat returns and transitions. That is a substantially harder defensive problem than conventional TDD.

Ruffy’s physical dimensions nevertheless make the Entry-Cost Adjustment important. Arman has to cross approximately four inches of height and several inches of reach against a striker with validated knockout power. Ruffy is particularly dangerous before Tsarukyan establishes contact, and Tsarukyan himself has specifically acknowledged Ruffy’s unusual striking and early danger. I therefore see Round 1 as Ruffy’s highest-leverage window. Arman cannot casually shoot from outside or spend extended periods kickboxing simply because his striking has improved.

Once Arman establishes sustained clinch/wrestling exchanges, however, the matchup should progressively move toward him. Ruffy’s striking requires space, rhythm and defensive responsibility from his opponent. Repeated level-change threats should reduce his kicking freedom and force a more conservative stance. Arman also has the cardio profile to keep rebuilding wrestling sequences if the initial attempts fail. His extensive wrestling/grappling competition during his UFC inactivity—including competitive wrestling against the considerably larger Colby Covington—provides additional evidence that this part of his game has remained active rather than deteriorating during the layoff.

The Market Divergence Audit is reassuring rather than alarming. Current pricing has Tsarukyan around -305 to -350 with Ruffy approximately +230 to +284, putting the market broadly in the same neighborhood as our model after removing the vig. I don’t see sufficient evidence to push Arman into the 80%+ range because Ruffy’s power, length and improving trajectory create genuine volatility. But across five rounds, Ruffy has to repeatedly solve an elite wrestling system, whereas Arman needs comparatively fewer successful entries to fundamentally alter the fight.

For method, I prefer submission over decision. Ruffy’s priority on returning upright should eventually create scrambling exposure, and Tsarukyan is dangerous enough positionally to exploit the neck or back once fatigue accumulates. Our SCV/SAR/FSC rules prevent projecting a submission simply because Arman can wrestle, but his demonstrated submission conversion—including the Hooker finish—passes that validation better than many control-oriented wrestlers. My projected sequence is a dangerous Ruffy first round, increasing Tsarukyan wrestling control in Round 2, followed by accumulated grappling pressure producing the Round 3 submission.

Confidence: High

The age profile matters substantially here. Pitbull is 39 and has been competing professionally since 2004, while Choi is 35 but has considerably less accumulated fight mileage. More importantly, their current trajectories differ. Choi enters after three consecutive stoppage victories, including his May 2026 TKO of Daniel Santos, while Pitbull’s UFC performances have shown a much more measured, lower-output version of the fighter who dominated Bellator. Under our CPDM/VLD/HVD framework, I’m reluctant to project prime-Pitbull explosiveness onto the current version.

The striking numbers expose the central problem. Pitbull has landed only about 2.77 significant strikes per minute while absorbing 4.61 in his UFC sample. Choi’s historical UFC output is around 5 significant strikes landed per minute. This activates DVC/OIP in Choi’s favor, but importantly it isn’t volume alone: Choi carries legitimate damaging power, with 14 of his 17 victories coming by KO/TKO. Pitbull’s countering remains dangerous enough that Choi cannot recklessly walk through the pocket, but I expect Choi to initiate and win considerably more striking exchanges.

Physical dimensions reinforce that problem. Choi is approximately four inches taller and has about a three-inch reach advantage. Pitbull historically compensated for being undersized through explosive entries, timing and counter power. At 39, however, VLD/CPDM become particularly relevant: even a modest deterioration in reaction speed and burst makes closing distance against the longer, busier fighter significantly harder. Unlike some aging-veteran matchups, I don’t see enough of a technical gap elsewhere to comfortably offset that.

Pitbull’s strongest alternative is grappling. He has 12 career submission victories and is far more multidimensional than Choi’s recent opponents. But our GUS/WUT/SAR rules matter here: having excellent historical grappling credentials is different from demonstrating a reliable current offensive wrestling pathway. Pitbull’s UFC statistics show just 1 successful takedown from 24 attempts, despite averaging 1.26 takedowns per 15 minutes. I therefore won’t assign him a large submission probability simply because his ground game is superior. If he does establish top position or take Choi’s back, however, that becomes his clearest route to flipping the matchup.

The MDA check supports rather than drives the prediction. Current prices around Choi -250/-265 and Pitbull +200/+215 translate to roughly the same neighborhood as our 66/34 assessment after accounting for bookmaker margin. I considered a Choi KO because both men absorb significant offense, but Pitbull remains extremely experienced, defensively aware and difficult to cleanly finish. Choi should instead control the geography of the fight with length, activity and cleaner combinations while Pitbull has isolated counter and grappling moments. Over three rounds, I expect those minutes to accumulate toward Choi by decision.

Confidence: High

This is a high-volatility light-heavyweight matchup. Baraniewski is 27, undefeated at 9-0, and remarkably has finished all nine opponents in Round 1, with seven knockouts and two submissions. His latest win was another stoppage, against Junior Tafa in June. Menifield, however, represents a major escalation in opposition: he is 38, has 18 UFC appearances, and just knocked out Mingyang Zhang in Round 1.

The model’s USN/EASV/LPS treatment is important with Baraniewski. His UFC sample remains tiny and his average fight time is only about one minute, so we should not infer that unobserved cardio, defensive wrestling or later-round performance are weaknesses. At the same time, those dimensions cannot be treated as proven strengths. His early power is the validated component. Menifield has fought dramatically stronger UFC competition, while Baraniewski’s UFC opponents collectively have a much weaker UFC win rate. That experience differential keeps this substantially closer than Baraniewski’s highlight reel might suggest.

The major reason I still favor Baraniewski is CPDM + PIM. There is an 11-year age gap—27 versus 38—at a division where reaction speed and durability against explosive punchers are particularly important. Menifield has also been stopped by strikes in four of his six professional losses and was knocked out by Volkan Oezdemir as recently as November 2025. Baraniewski therefore attacks an already demonstrated vulnerability rather than a hypothetical one.

But Baraniewski’s aggression creates substantial danger for himself. His early UFC numbers are absurd—around 11 significant strikes landed per minute—but he has also absorbed roughly 9 per minute. Those statistics come from an extremely short sample and shouldn’t be projected literally, yet the underlying pattern matters: he is willing to exchange. Menifield owns a three-inch reach advantage and serious counter power. Under our DVC/HPR framework, I give Menifield considerably more knockout equity than a conventional +200 underdog because Baraniewski’s pressure repeatedly creates opportunities for exactly the kind of counter that Menifield can still deliver.

The MDA is therefore noteworthy. The market currently has Baraniewski roughly -230 to -260 and Menifield around +190 to +210, corresponding approximately to a high-60s percentage for Baraniewski after removing vig. I’m deliberately below that at 62%. The market may be assigning too much certainty to an undefeated 9-0 prospect whose fights have ended so quickly that several important MMA dimensions remain largely untested. I expect Menifield to make Round 1 much more competitive than Baraniewski’s previous opponents. If Baraniewski avoids getting caught during those violent initial exchanges, however, his youth, hand speed, combinations and sustained offensive explosiveness should increasingly expose Menifield’s declining durability. Baraniewski KO Round 2.

Confidence: Moderate