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The information presented here is strictly for informational and analytical purposes only. It does not constitute betting advice, financial advice, or a recommendation to place any wagers. All insights and predictions are based on data analysis and do not guarantee any outcomes. Please gamble responsibly and consult a professional advisor if you need financial guidance.


Silva has the substantially stronger MMA résumé. She is 8-0 in the UFC and her last three victories came over Jessica Andrade, Alexa Grasso and Rose Namajunas. Wang has developed quickly, including recent wins over Eduarda Moura and Tracy Cortez, but she has not yet been tested across anything resembling Silva’s sequence of elite opposition. Silva’s win over Namajunas was close and controversial, however, so I don’t want to treat the résumé gap as proof that Silva dominates this matchup.
The striking matchup is considerably closer than their rankings suggest. Wang’s offensive numbers are exceptional: roughly 8 significant strikes landed per minute at 58% accuracy in the available flyweight sample, while Silva’s major advantage is defense—about 66% striking defense and only 2.36 significant strikes absorbed per minute. This activates ODC/POR rather than letting me simply reward Wang’s raw output. Silva is unusually difficult to maintain offense against because her movement forces repeated resets. Wang needs to convert her theoretical volume against that moving target.
Wang nevertheless has legitimate upset equity. She is the naturally bigger woman, an elite-adjacent kickboxing talent, carries cleaner combination offense than most of Silva’s opponents and has demonstrated very strong takedown defense. If she cuts off rather than follows Silva, attacks the body/legs and forces prolonged boxing exchanges, she can win rounds through damage and sustained output. Under EASV, her kickboxing background gets full credit rather than being discounted because her elite-level MMA sample is smaller.
The biggest separator is the championship-fight environment. Neither woman has fought five UFC rounds, and this fight occurs at Salt Lake City altitude. More importantly, Wang reportedly received only 17 days to prepare, and she has previously had weight-management issues. That combination creates uncertainty around rounds 4–5. Silva’s movement-heavy style can make Wang expend energy cutting the cage while giving Silva more opportunities to adjust tactically as the fight develops.
I also would not overrate Silva’s grappling path because of Wang’s submission loss to Gabriella Fernandes. SAR/SCV/WUT apply: Silva isn’t a persistent offensive wrestler, while Wang has subsequently shown strong takedown defense. Grappling is more valuable here as a secondary threat that interrupts Wang’s striking rhythm than as Silva’s expected finishing mechanism. Conversely, Wang’s Moura fight showed that she can concede meaningful control and still win through superior damage/output, which reinforces the need to separate takedowns from actual grappling utility.
The current market is approximately Silva -200 to -210, roughly consistent with a mid-to-high-60s true probability after removing the vig. My 67/33 therefore produces no meaningful MDA alarm. The matchup is competitive enough that I don’t want to push Silva into the 70s: Wang’s accuracy, size, kickboxing pedigree and output are real weapons. But Silva’s defense, movement, tactical versatility, age advantage, elite-opposition validation and better expected reliability over 25 minutes give her the edge.
Final: Natalia Silva 67% - Wang Cong 33% Prediction: Natalia Silva by Decision


This matchup strongly activates CPDM. Figueiredo is 38 while Talbott is 28, and Talbott also owns roughly a five-inch height advantage. More importantly, the physical differences align with the stylistic ones: Talbott is younger, longer, considerably higher-volume and capable of sustaining combinations while Figueiredo has increasingly become a low-output, explosive counter fighter. Recent data illustrates the divergence: Talbott has been landing around six significant strikes per minute compared with roughly 2–3 for Figueiredo.
The important correction from our newer POR/ODC rules is that I don’t simply extrapolate Talbott’s volume. Barcelos already demonstrated that Talbott’s offensive rhythm can be disrupted through wrestling, control and veteran positional work. Figueiredo therefore has a legitimate blueprint. But the question under WUT/GUS is whether he can repeatedly execute it. Talbott’s takedown defense is around 70%+, while Figueiredo’s recent takedown success has been inconsistent. A couple of takedowns or submission threats aren’t enough if Talbott wins most of the striking minutes.
Figueiredo nevertheless has substantially more upset equity than a simple striking-stat comparison suggests. He has nine career submissions and nine knockouts, and Talbott’s aggressive combinations can create reactive takedown and scramble opportunities. OGE/SAR/SCV matter here: unlike a fighter possessing BJJ credentials without positional access, Figueiredo has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to turn transitions into genuine submission threats. Talbott cannot recklessly chase combinations after hurting him.
The recent trajectory is difficult to ignore. Talbott rebounded from the Barcelos loss with victories over Felipe Lima and Henry Cejudo and is now 11-1. Figueiredo has gone through a much harder schedule, but his recent results show deterioration against elite bantamweights: losses to Cory Sandhagen, Petr Yan, Umar Nurmagomedov and most recently Song Yadong surround only a split-decision victory over Montel Jackson. This is where HVD works in reverse: I don’t want to excuse a repeated current pattern merely because Figueiredo historically performed at championship level.
There is also an important fight-week variable: Salt Lake City’s altitude. Figueiredo has specifically prepared in Salt Lake City to acclimatize, which reduces what otherwise could have been a significant concern for an older fighter dependent on explosive bursts. That preparation keeps me from pushing Talbott’s probability even higher.
Finally, MDA triggers strongly. The market has Figueiredo around +442, corresponding to only about an 18% no-vig probability. My model gives him 24%, so I am materially less pessimistic about Figueiredo than the market. His experience, power, grappling, opportunistic submission game and Talbott’s demonstrated vulnerability to wrestling justify retaining additional upset equity. But they don’t overcome the convergence of age, size, sustained output, athleticism and recent developmental trajectory.
Final: Deiveson Figueiredo 24% - Payton Talbott 76% Prediction: Payton Talbott by Decision


The largest signal is CPDM combined with recent damage. Green is 40 and Ribovics is 30, a particularly concerning gap for a matchup built around reaction speed and pocket defense. Green’s defense historically depended on seeing punches, subtly moving his head and shoulders and countering immediately. Recent knockout losses to Jalin Turner and Mauricio Ruffy provide current evidence that this defensive system has become less reliable against fast, committed power combinations. This isn’t an old vulnerability being overweighted under HVD; it’s recent corroboration against dangerous strikers.
Ribovics is particularly well equipped to attack that vulnerability. His fights with Daniel Zellhuber and Nasrat Haqparast demonstrated that he can sustain extremely high offensive output while remaining dangerous deep into fights. Unlike a one-shot power puncher, Ribovics strings together attacks and continues punching when opponents initially evade. That matters against Green because defeating his shoulder-roll/head-movement defense often requires the second, third and fourth strike rather than the initial entry.
ODC prevents me from treating Ribovics’ offense as a free advantage. His willingness to exchange means Green should get counter opportunities, and Green remains technically sophisticated enough to exploit them. Ribovics absorbed substantial offense from Zellhuber, while Green can produce very high boxing volume when opponents willingly remain in his preferred range. If Green establishes his jab, frustrates Ribovics’ entries and makes him reset rather than exchange continuously, Green has a legitimate decision pathway.
The crucial question is Projected Output Reliability. Green historically possesses the volume necessary to win this kind of fight, but I am less confident that his defensive reactions remain reliable enough to sustain that output against Ribovics for three rounds. Ribovics doesn’t need to dominate every exchange. He needs enough repeated pocket interactions for one combination to penetrate Green’s increasingly fragile defensive layer. The accumulated evidence makes that more likely than Green maintaining a clean technical boxing match for 15 minutes.
There isn’t an obvious grappling escape hatch for Green either. He can wrestle situationally, but sustained takedown/control offense isn’t normally the foundation of his game. Under WUT/GUS, I won’t substantially increase his probability simply because wrestling theoretically gives him another avenue. He would need repeated entries, meaningful control and enough offensive production to actually bank rounds. Ribovics should therefore get considerably more striking exposure than he would against a dedicated wrestler.
The market is extremely wide, with Ribovics around the -400 range at current books, making Green roughly a 20% underdog after normalization. That triggers a careful MDA check but doesn’t produce enough evidence for me to follow the market all the way. Green’s experience, awkward boxing, counter accuracy and Ribovics’ defensive openness deserve meaningful respect. I therefore retain 25% Green upset equity, but the combination of Ribovics’ youth, durability, sustained pressure, combination volume and Green’s recent knockout vulnerability makes this one of the clearer stylistic age-transition fights on the card.
Final: King Green 25% - Esteban Ribovics 75% Prediction: Esteban Ribovics by KO/TKO, Round 2


This is fundamentally a high-volatility power matchup, so 64/36 is already fairly substantial confidence. Both men possess fight-changing power. Williams has repeatedly demonstrated that he can end fights almost instantaneously, while Soldić built much of his reputation around devastating left-hand counters and combination finishing. Because both fighters’ strongest weapons directly attack the other’s defensive vulnerabilities, ODC requires increasing upset variance rather than treating Soldić’s cleaner offense as independently additive. Williams remains dangerous for virtually every second this stays standing.
Soldić nevertheless has the more complete striking process. His power isn’t dependent exclusively on explosive blitzes: he can pressure behind combinations, attack the body, counter moving backward and generate knockouts from relatively short punches. Williams’ offense is more episodic. His athleticism and hand speed can produce spectacular moments, but POR matters here—his ability to consistently generate effective offense across an entire fight has been less reliable than his highlight-reel power suggests. Soldić should therefore win a greater percentage of neutral striking minutes between the major exchanges.
Williams’ recent trajectory also raises concerns. He has suffered damaging knockout losses during his UFC run, including Randy Brown’s head-kick finish, and at 32 he is no longer being evaluated as an inexperienced prospect whose defensive deficiencies can automatically be expected to disappear. Soldić’s left hand is exactly the sort of compact, accurate power weapon that can punish Williams when he overcommits entering the pocket. At the same time, FFR applies strongly to Soldić: if he aggressively chases an early finish and doesn’t get it, Williams becomes exceptionally dangerous during the resulting transitions and counters.
Soldić’s broader combat résumé gets meaningful weight under EASV. He became a two-division KSW champion and has faced experienced opposition outside the UFC rather than accumulating an inflated record against developmental competition. His ONE Championship run was disrupted by the no-contest against Murad Ramazanov and the knockout loss to Zebaztian Kadestam, but he subsequently rebuilt momentum with knockout victories. The Kadestam result is especially important because it prevents treating Soldić’s striking pedigree as proof of defensive safety—he absolutely can be caught by another elite power puncher.
I don’t see wrestling as sufficiently reliable to fundamentally change the matchup. Williams can mix takedowns and Soldić has functional grappling, but neither man’s strongest predictive pathway is prolonged control. Under WUT/GUS, occasional takedowns or clinch sequences receive limited weight unless they reliably convert into control, damage or submission opportunities. The probability distribution therefore remains unusually concentrated around striking exchanges—and consequently around knockout outcomes.
The methodological distinction is important here: Soldić is the more likely winner without necessarily being the dramatically safer fighter. Williams’ raw power, athleticism and explosiveness keep his finishing equity unusually high even if he loses more individual minutes. I have Soldić winning approximately two-thirds of the matchup because his combination structure, countering, offensive consistency and overall striking sophistication should create more opportunities. But Williams’ power plus Soldić’s demonstrated vulnerability to being knocked out prevents this from reaching the 70%+ range.
Final: Roberto Soldić 64% - Kalinn Williams 36% Prediction: Roberto Soldić by KO/TKO, Round 2


The physical convergence is difficult to ignore. Gautier is 24 to Kopylov’s 34/35, stands 6’4” to 6’0”, and has an 81-inch reach against 75 inches. This isn’t merely cosmetic size: Gautier’s game actually utilizes long-range striking, while Kopylov normally does some of his best work once he establishes kicking and combination range. Kopylov therefore has to repeatedly cross a six-inch reach disadvantage against an exceptionally powerful counter threat.
Gautier’s developmental trajectory is also unusually strong. He’s 11-1 overall, 5-0 in the UFC, with nine career knockouts and seven first-round finishes. His UFC run has included stoppages of José Medina, Robert Valentin, Tre’ston Vines and Ozzy Diaz, with the Andrey Pulyaev decision providing useful evidence that Gautier can function when an opponent survives his initial power. That matters under FFR: I’m considerably more comfortable with Gautier now that his projection doesn’t require an early knockout.
Kopylov is easily Gautier’s most sophisticated striking test, however. His UFC experience is substantially deeper, and his recent résumé includes Chris Curtis, Paulo Costa, Gregory Rodrigues and Marco Tulio. He beat Curtis by third-round knockout and most recently defeated Tulio by decision. Under POR/HPR, that gives Kopylov a major reliability advantage: we’ve seen his striking operate against UFC-level resistance for considerably longer than Gautier’s.
The statistical interaction nevertheless favors Gautier. He absorbs only about 2.6 significant strikes per minute, whereas Kopylov absorbs roughly 5.1. Gautier also generates considerably more knockdowns relative to cage time. I don’t interpret that as Kopylov having bad striking defense—opponent quality and Gautier’s shorter UFC fights distort the comparison—but Kopylov’s willingness to exchange becomes dangerous against someone with Gautier’s combination of reach, speed and power.
CPDM is important but needs restraint. A ten-year age difference at middleweight is meaningful, especially when the younger fighter simultaneously possesses the superior length and explosiveness. But Kopylov hasn’t shown the kind of obvious physical collapse that would justify treating age as an independent reason to fade him. His output has actually remained stable into later rounds. So the age gap amplifies Gautier’s existing athletic advantages rather than automatically creating them.
I also don’t see wrestling as Kopylov’s solution. He’s become more willing to use it and averages roughly 1.1 takedowns per 15 minutes, but Gautier’s current takedown-defense numbers are above 90%. The sample remains thin, so WUT/GUS/CDCF prevent me from declaring Gautier an elite defensive wrestler. Still, Kopylov hasn’t demonstrated enough sustained control offense for me to project wrestling as a dependable round-winning alternative if he’s uncomfortable striking at range.
The market deserves attention here. Gautier is approximately -210, with Kopylov around +180, which places the market’s normalized expectation around the high-60s for Gautier. My 70/30 is therefore close enough that MDA doesn’t identify a major disagreement.
The principal danger to this pick is prospect uncertainty. Gautier’s ceiling looks extremely high, but Kopylov represents a major step upward in technical experience. If Kopylov survives the opening exchanges, attacks Gautier’s body and legs, forces him to reset, and takes the fight deep, his probability rises substantially. That keeps me from pushing Gautier toward 75–80%.
But Gautier doesn’t need to win a delicate technical kickboxing match. His six-inch reach advantage, youth, speed and substantially greater single-strike consequence force Kopylov to navigate dangerous entries repeatedly. Over three rounds, I expect one of those exchanges eventually to produce the decisive damage.
Final: Ateba Gautier 70% - Roman Kopylov 30% Prediction: Ateba Gautier by KO/TKO, Round 2