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The prediction favored RJ Harris because his broader offensive toolkit appeared to give him more ways to win, while Frye’s previous UFC performance raised questions about whether his knockout-heavy regional success would translate consistently against stronger competition. That assessment underestimated how dangerous Frye’s power remained even if he could not reliably dominate entire rounds. Harris was having success early, but Frye needed only one clean sequence to change the fight and produce the knockout. The main lesson is that in low-data heavyweight matchups, proven finishing power must retain substantial predictive weight, and a fighter should not receive a significant advantage simply because he appears to have more theoretical paths to victory.
Franco was one of the most confident selections because his youth, physicality, recent momentum and ability to threaten both striking and grappling appeared especially problematic for an opponent who had repeatedly been finished. The prediction correctly recognized Ribeiro’s submission ability but substantially underestimated how dangerous that threat would become during Franco’s own offensive grappling. Franco initiated the takedown sequence but exposed himself to the guillotine, allowing Ribeiro to turn what appeared to be Franco’s advantage into the fight-ending opportunity. The key lesson is that offensive wrestling cannot always be treated as an additional safe pathway against a dangerous submission fighter; initiating grappling can simultaneously increase the opponent’s finishing opportunities, and that reciprocal risk needs to meaningfully reduce confidence in otherwise strong favorites.
The prediction favored Shahbazyan because Price’s recent submission losses appeared to align directly with Shahbazyan’s strongest offensive weapon, but the analysis placed too much weight on the type of Price’s previous losses without sufficiently establishing whether Shahbazyan could recreate those same grappling conditions against UFC-level opposition. At the same time, Shahbazyan’s repeated history of being stopped by strikes was a well-established vulnerability that directly intersected with Price’s enduring power and chaotic finishing ability. Price survived the submission threat and quickly turned the fight into the kind of violent transitional exchange that favored him. The lesson is that a vulnerability exposed by one opponent cannot automatically be transferred to another fighter simply because they possess a similar nominal skill; the ability to access and reliably convert that weapon must be independently validated.
The prediction placed too much emphasis on Tanzilovi’s wrestling-heavy UFC debut and consequently underestimated the breadth of his striking offense and finishing ability. That debut occurred under circumstances that were not fully representative of his normal competitive environment, while his broader record already demonstrated that he was capable of ending fights with strikes. Against Wellmaker, Tanzilovi showed a much more complete game, survived dangerous moments and ultimately found the head-kick finish. The main lesson is that a single UFC appearance—particularly one occurring under unusual preparation or weight-class circumstances—should not redefine a fighter’s established skill profile. Broader career evidence must remain relevant until a larger UFC sample demonstrates that the fighter has fundamentally changed.
The prediction favored Kamaka because his youth, pressure, consistency and ability to mix boxing with wrestling appeared more reliable over three rounds, while Fili’s age, mileage and previous stoppage losses suggested declining physical margins. The mistake was allowing those decline indicators to overshadow technical skills that Fili was still demonstrating effectively. His range management, stance changes, timing and varied kicking remained functional, and those veteran weapons allowed him to control important exchanges before producing the knockout. The lesson is that chronological age and career mileage should not automatically downgrade technical capabilities that remain visibly effective; decline needs to be tied to specific deteriorating attributes rather than applied broadly to the fighter’s entire game.
The prediction correctly identified Herbert’s substantial reach advantage as the central obstacle for Camilo but did not give that disadvantage enough weight when setting the final probability. Camilo initially succeeded in crossing the distance, securing takedowns and reaching strong grappling positions, but he could not consistently retain those positions or generate enough offense from them. Herbert’s ability to escape and reverse those exchanges forced Camilo to expend significant energy, and Herbert’s length, jab and kicking game became increasingly effective as the fight progressed. The main lesson is that successful takedowns and temporary dominant positions should not automatically receive full predictive value; the ability to retain position, produce meaningful offense and avoid costly reversals is just as important as completing the initial takedown.